Fourth Review Conference
of the Parties to the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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AUSTRALIA, AUSTRIA, CANADA, DENMARK, FINLAND, IRELAND, NETHERLANDS, NEW ZEALAND, NORWAY, SWEDEN

Working Paper:

Suggested elements for final document language on Article III of the NPT

1. The Conference recalls the generally positive assessment of the Third Review Conference of the implementation of Article III, and notes that the recommendations of that Conference for the future implementation of that Article provided a helpful basis for States Party to the Treaty and the IAEA to strengthen further the barriers to proliferation and provide assurance of compliance with non-proliferation undertakings.

2. The Conference affirms its determination to strengthen further the barriers against the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices to additional States. The Parties remain convinced that universal adherence to the NPT and full compliance with its provisions is the best way to achieve this goal and they urge all States not party to the Treaty to accede to it.

3. The Conference expresses the conviction that IAEA safeguards provide assurance that States are complying with their undertakings under Article III and assist States in demonstrating this compliance. IAEA safeguards play a key role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. Unsafeguarded nuclear activities in non-nuclear-weapon States still pose serious proliferation dangers. The Conference reiterates the calls for the continued pursuit of the principle of universal application of IAEA safeguards to all peaceful nuclear activities in all States.

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4. The Conference notes with satisfaction that since the Last Review Conference, the IAEA has again, in carrying out its safeguards activities, not detected any diversion of a significant amount of safeguarded material to the production of nuclear weapons, other nuclear explosive devices or to purposes unknown.

5. The Conference notes that IAEA safeguards activities have not hampered the peaceful nuclear development of the Parties to the Treaty but have furthered international co-operation in the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy.

6. The Conference commends the IAEA on its implementation of safeguards pursuant to this Treaty. It notes continued improvements in safeguards cost effectiveness and efficiency and urges this to be maintained inter alia by utilizing new cost efficient technologies and methodologies. It emphasizes the importance of maintaining a staff of the highest professional standard with due regard to the widest geographical distribution possible.

7. The Conference notes the request of the Director General of the IAEA for States to facilitate the designation of inspectors, and calls on States to respond as fully as possible so as to maximize the efficient use of Agency inspection resources.

8. The Conference calls upon all States to take IAEA safeguards requirements into account while planning, designing and constructing new nuclear facilities and while modifying existing ones.

9. The Conference recognizes that there are other items including tritium which are relevant to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and therefore to the NPT as a whole. The Conference calls for co-ordinated steps to ensure appropriate non-proliferation arrangements to apply to such items.

10. The Conference recognizes the importance of State systems of accounting and control to the efficient and effective application of safeguards, and urges continued improvements in this area including with the valuable assistance of IAEA and national programs of training in such systems. It also notes in this regard the complementary and important role of national export and import control mechanisms.

11. The Conference calls upon States Party to continue their political, technical and financial support of the IAEA safeguards system in order to ensure that the IAEA is able to meet its international legal obligations pursuant to safeguards agreements under the Treaty, and its increasing safeguards responsibilities. It notes the importance of continued assured

regular budget financing to permit the IAEA to meet its growing commitments in this area, and welcomes efforts by members of the IAEA to find a lasting and equitable solution to the question of a safeguards financing formula.

12. The Conference welcomes the entry into force of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material which resulted from a recommendation of the first NPT Review Conference. The Conference notes that membership of the Convention has increased to 28. The Conference urges all States that have not done so to adhere to the Convention at the earliest possible date.

13. The Conference calls on the nuclear-weapon States to maintain the highest standards of security and physical protection of nuclear weapon systems and materials.

14. The Conference recognizes the non-proliferation benefits of the conversion of research reactors from high enriched to low enriched fuel. It welcomes continuing international co-operation in the introduction of such conversions.

15. The Conference recognizes the particular requirements for safeguards and physical protection of direct use nuclear material and notes the amounts of separated plutonium intended for peaceful purposes are expected to increase significantly in the 1990s. The Conference expressed satisfaction at the considerable work undertaken to ensure the continuing effectiveness of IAEA safeguards in relation to reprocessing and the storage and use of separated plutonium.

16. The Conference recalls the recommendations at the Third Review Conference on the implementation of article XII.A.5 of the Statute of the IAEA, and calls on the IAEA to consider studying the need to arrange for deposit with the Agency, as foreseen in its Statute, of any excess of any special fissionable materials recovered or produced as a by-product over what is needed in order to prevent stock-piling of materials that could be diverted to direct use for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices. In this context, the question of highly enriched uranium stocks resulting from the conversion of research reactor fuel to low enrichment might also be considered further in that study.

Fourth Review Conference
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PROPOSED FINAL DOCUMENT LANGUAGE RELATING TO
SAFEGUARDS IN NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES

Working Paper submitted by Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden

The Conference recognized the value of the voluntary offer safeguards agreements of the five nuclear-weapon States in contributing to the goal of the universal application of IAEA safeguards to all peaceful nuclear activities in all States. In this regard the Conference welcomes the entry into force since the last Review Conference of such a voluntary offer agreement between China and the IAEA. Recognizing that some nuclear-weapon States have already made all their peaceful nuclear facilities and activities eligible for safeguards under their voluntary offers, the Conference calls on all other nuclear-weapon States to do so. Within this framework the Conference calls for the wider application of safeguards to civil nuclear facilities in the nuclear-weapon States in the most economic and practical way possible. It is vital to ensure that the IAEA has adequate resources for this purpose. In this context the Conference invites the IAEA to consider studying new safeguards approaches for nuclear-weapon States including where appropriate a combination of full reporting and verification by random inspection.

The Conference also calls for a further separation of the civil and military facilities in the nuclear-weapon States. It affirms the great value of commitments by the nuclear-weapon States that nuclear supplies for peaceful purposes will not be used for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive

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devices. The observance of these commitments should be verified through IAEA safeguards, in accordance with the voluntary offer safeguards agreement of the nuclear-weapon States.

The Conference urges the nuclear-weapon States to offer for verification all transfers of nuclear materials and nuclear installations from military use to peaceful purposes by submitting them to IAEA safeguards under their voluntary offer safeguards agreements with the IAEA.

Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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FORMULATION OF THE FINAL DECLARATION FOR ITS PART RELEVANT TO ARTICLE VII OF THE TREATY

Working Paper submitted by Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Recalling the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations emphasizing, inter alia, that the process of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in different parts of the world should be encouraged with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons,

Being convinced that creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in such areas like the Korean peninsula where the situation is extremely tense with large armed forces in confrontation will substantially contribute to removal of the hotbeds of a nuclear war and to realization of the objectives of the Treaty,

Recognizing that the process of transforming the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-weapon-free zone will greatly encourage universal application of the IAEA safeguards system,

The Conference urges all parties concerned to express their political will in favour of converting the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

The Conference also invites all the States parties to the Treaty, nuclear and non-nuclear, to support and to assist in the establishment of such zone in the Korean peninsula.

Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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SUGGESTED LANGUAGE FOR FINAL DOCUMENT ON ARTICLE VII;
SOUTH PACIFIC NUCLEAR FREE ZONE TREATY

Working Paper submitted by Australia and New Zealand

The Conference notes that the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (also known as the Treaty of Rarotonga) entered into force on 11 December 1986 following deposit of the eighth instrument of ratification. The Conference also notes with satisfaction that 11 members of the South Pacific Forum have now ratified the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty and that the Treaty has been commended by a resolution of the United Nations General Assembly at its forty-fourth session.

The Conference further notes that China and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics have adhered to the two protocols of the Treaty open to them, Protocols 2 and 3. The United States has stated that none of its practices and activities within the Treaty area are inconsistent with the Treaty and its Protocols. The United Kingdom has announced that it would respect the intentions of regional States on Protocols 1 and 3. France, which continues to test nuclear weapons in the region, has formally decided not to adhere to the Protocols.

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PROPOSED LANGUAGE FOR INCLUSION IN THE FINAL DECLARATION ON ARTICLE VII CONCERNING NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONES

Working Paper submitted by Nigeria

The Conference considers that the development of a nuclear weapon capability by South Africa at any time frustrates the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa and that collaboration with South Africa in this area would undermine the credibility and the stability of the Non-Proliferation Treaty régime. South Africa is called upon to submit all its nuclear installations and facilities to IAEA safeguards and to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. All States Parties directly concerned are urged to consider seriously taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa. The nuclear weapon States are invited to assist the efforts of States to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa, and to enter into binding undertakings to respect strictly the status of such a zone and to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States of the zone.

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PROPOSED FINAL DOCUMENT LANGUAGE RELATING TO THE CONDITIONS OF NUCLEAR SUPPLY (FULL SCOPE SAFEGUARDS) AND THE CONCLUSION OF SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS

Working Paper Submitted by Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, Hungary, Indonesia, Ireland, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Sweden and Yugoslavia

The Conference urges all non-nuclear-weapon States which have not already done so to make an international legally-binding commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and to accept IAEA safeguards on all their peaceful nuclear activities, both current and future, to verify that commitment. The Conference further urges nuclear supplier States to require henceforth as a necessary condition for the transfer of relevant nuclear supplies to non-nuclear-weapon States under new supply arrangements, such a commitment and acceptance of such safeguards. The Conference expresses its view that accession to the Treaty is the best way to achieve these objectives. The Conference stresses that the application of such safeguards in additional States should not diminish resources for the IAEA's promotional programmes in the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

The Conference notes with satisfaction that eight States have concluded safeguards agreements in compliance with Article III (4) of the Treaty since 1985. It expresses concern, however, that 51 States Parties to the Treaty have yet to conclude their agreements and urges that they do so as soon

as possible. It is its view that the Treaty requirement for the timely conclusion of an NPT-type safeguards agreement is particularly important in States whose nuclear activities make such safeguards applicable.

The Conference also recommends that the Director General of the IAEA as a matter of priority further facilitiate the conclusion of such agreements and that Parties to the Treaty, in particular the Depositary Parties, should actively support this activity. The Conference notes that in the case of States without significant nuclear activities, conclusion of safeguards agreements involves simplified procedures.

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PROPOSED FINAL DOCUMENT LANGUAGE RELATING TO THE CONDITIONS OF NUCLEAR SUPPLY (FULL SCOPE SAFEGUARDS) AND THE CONCLUSION OF SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS

Working Paper Submitted by Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, Hungary, Indonesia, Ireland, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Sweden and Yugoslavia

Add the following countries to the list of co-sponsors:

Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, German Democratic Republic, Philippines, Singapore, Cyprus.

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Fourth Review Conference
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PROPOSED FINAL DOCUMENT LANGUAGE RELATING TO THE CONDITIONS OF NUCLEAR SUPPLY (FULL SCOPE SAFEGUARDS) AND THE CONCLUSION OF SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS

Working Paper submitted by Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, Hungary, Indonesia, Ireland, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Sweden and Yugoslavia

Add the following country to the list of co-sponsors: Uruguay.

Fourth Review Conference
of the Parties to the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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REGIONAL NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

Working Paper submitted by Egypt

Proposal for inclusion in the Final Declaration:

1. The nuclear-weapon States and all other States are requested to participate actively and render assistance to States party to regional conflicts with a view to reaching arrangements for establishing nuclear weapon-free zones in their respective regions.

2. Nuclear-weapon States should refrain from extending assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to non-NPT States parties to regional conflicts.

3. All States exporting nuclear installations, equipment, information or materials to States party to regional conflicts should ensure that such transfers should be subjected to IAEA full-scope safeguards.

4. All States party, particularly the nuclear-weapon States in their capacity as depositaries, are called upon to ensure the adherence of all States in the Middle East and in particular Israel to the NPT and the acceptance of the IAEA safeguards system. The application of IAEA safeguards on their respective nuclear activities would, as a confidence-building measure, contribute in reducing tension and promoting peace and security through ensuring "the total absence of nuclear weapons" in the region.

5. Nuclear-weapon States and all other States are requested to support the establishment of a Zone Free from all Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East as an important contribution aimed at consolidating regional as well as international peace and security.

Fourth Review Conference
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PROPOSED LANGUAGE FOR INCLUSION IN THE FINAL DOCUMENT OF THE FOURTH NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE, RELATED TO ARTICLE III OF THE NPT

Working Paper presented by Hungary, Italy and Yugoslavia

The Conference,

- recognizing the importance of measures serving to maintain and strengthen confidence in the efficiency of the safeguards system of the IAEA,
- recommends to the IAEA to improve upon the transparency of presentation of the results of its safeguards activities in order to dispel public anxieties and to prevent possible misinformation.

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on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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PROPOSED FINAL DOCUMENT LANGUAGE RELATING TO ARTICLE X

Working Paper presented by Mexico

Paragraph 2 of Article X of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) reads as follows:

"Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty".

The history of the NPT negotiations clearly shows that there is a close link between the Treaty's provisions regarding nuclear disarmament measures, on the one hand, and the review conference and its limited duration, on the other. It also shows that the duration of the Treaty is connected to the provisions of Article VI and that the permanent viability of the NPT will depend on successful negotiations of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, as the most important measure related to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament.

The Final Document should contain the following:

Since the provisons of paragraph 2 of Article X were drafted in connection with the provisions of Article VI, it is incumbent upon the nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty to begin to meet their obligations set forth in Article VI in order to achieve a significant extension of the NPT beyond 1995.

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